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Many Latin American countries, including Brazil, pursued an aggressive supply-
leading ~pproach to agricultural credit policy beginning in the mid 1960s. Many Asian 
countries did the same. The results have been largely negative. However, three 
relativdy successful "flagship" institutions have emerged in Asia with strong outreach 
and sustainability. This paper highlights these three institutions and analyzes their 
i 
success using a three-pronged analytical framework of policy environment, financial 
infrastrqcture and institutional development. 
I 




~eginning in the 1960s, many Latin American countries, including Brazil, pursued an 
aggressive supply-leading approach to agricultural credit policy (Araujo, Shirota, and Meyer, 
I 
1990). Massive amounts of subsidized funds were supplied to agriculture. Lending quotas were 
imposed I on commercial banks. Specialized agricultural development banks and cooperatives 
I 




Subsidies are often concentrated in a few borrowers. Many financial institutions have failed, 
' 
many ha~e had to be recapitalized, and many weak institutions have struggled with large 
I 
I 
nonperf9rming portfolios. Few countries have developed strong institutions capable of serving 
i 
large nu~bers of rural farm and nonfarm clients. Large segments of the financial system are 
charactefized by limited outreach and poor sustainability. The poor tend to have the least access 
I 
to formaJ financial services. 
I 
<Dur recent analysis of Asia's rural financial markets revealed similar problems in many 
I 
countrie~ (Meyer and Nagarajan, 2000).1 Policymakers have actively intervened in financial 
I 
markets ~n attempting to meet economic and social objectives, first to support the Green 
Revoluti~n and, more recently, to reduce poverty. A positive feature in some countries, however, 
I 
I 
is a larg9 amount of experimentation, especially by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to 
i 
break th~ access barriers faced by the poor. Recent innovations appear to be more promising 
! 
than the Farlier attempts to induce lenders to serve small farmers, but some disturbing problems 
' 
I 
have als~ begun to appear in some programs. In spite of this generally negative situation, three 
I 
1 This p1per draws on research conducted for the Asian Development Bank. The results were presented in 
a longer ~ersion of this paper at the APO Symposium on Agricultural Credit held in Tokyo September 8-
14, 1999tThe support provided by the ADB and the APO and the assistance of many people who helped 
with the udy are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed here are personal and may not be shared 
by the A B, the APO, or any of the persons who assisted in the study. Unless specifically noted, the 
referencef and sources of data used in this paper are reported in the ADB study. 
2 
relatively successful "flagship" institutions have emerged in Asia with strong outreach and 
sustainability features. Understanding their success provides insights into methods for improving 
the performance of rural financial markets that may have applicability in Brazil. This paper 
highlights these institutions and factors that contributed to their success. 
II. The Asian Approach to Developing Rural Financial Markets 
The aggressive directed credit approach to agricultural lending pursued by many Asian 
policymakers can be summarized by the following nine general characteristics: 
1. Interest rates for loans are subsidized and rates for small farmers are especially low. 
2. Governments and donors are major sources of funds and local savings mobilization is 
largely ignored. 
3. The policy objective is to increase the supply of loans made to farmers and 
microentrepreneurs with little attention paid to institutional sustainability. 
4. Production packages are created with credit treated as an input like seeds and fertilizer. 
5. Credit is targeted for "productive purposes." Loans for consumption and rural nonfarm 
enterprises are ignored and, in some cases, prohibited. 
6. Many credit programs target small farmers and employ supervised credit through 
cooperatives as a means to ensure it is used properly. 
7. Cooperatives are often the primary credit channels, while commercial banks and 
agricultural development banks are more important in some countries. 
8. Transaction costs for lenders and borrowers are largely ignored. 
9. Some recent programs have broadened their target from small farmers to the rural poor. 
Our case studies and other Asian literature revealed that a surprisingly large number of 
countries have made relatively little progress in the past two decades. Subsidizing borrowers 
continues to be the primary objective and sustainability of financial institutions is secondary. Yet 
there is little conclusive evidence that subsidies reach the intended persons, or that subsidized 
I 
loans mJke a significant impact on technological change and agricultural output. There are 
importa~t exceptions but the problems today are similar to those reported in ADB studies in the 
1970s: 
1. ~nterest rates are often too low to cover the costs and risks of lending. Some 
iinicrofinance organizations (MFOs) set rates high enough to cover most costs, but 
I 
~egulations and political pressures keep many agricultural lenders from raising rates to 
I f dequate levels. 
3 
2. rany countries resist adopting a market-oriented approach to rural finance. Targeted 
trograms, subsidized refinance funds, and restrictions on clientele that can be served still 
~xist even though some repressive features of directed credit have been eliminated. 
3. ~onperforming loans are a serious problem. Many rural financial institutions, especially 
I 
~everal agricultural development banks, are weak and depend on subsidies. 
I 
4. $avings mobilization is still relatively neglected in spite of the early successes observed 
I 
ty rural cooperatives in Japan, Republic of Korea and Taiwan. 
5. tolicymakers emphasize the problems of agriculture and overlook the broader demand 
I 
ror financial services by the rural nonfarm economy. 
6. ~ost rural financial institutions are unprepared to make long-term loans and to utilize the 
i 
~xplosion in new information and communication technologies for modernizing banking 
I 
III. ThJ Positive Example of Three Flagship Institutions 
fortunately, the entire Asian rural finance experience is not as bleak as described above. 
Three i+titutions have performed far better than most rural financial institutions in the 
develop~g world. These flagship institutions are the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
! 
Coopera ives (BAAC) in Thailand, the BRI unit desa system of Bank Rakyat in Indonesia (BRI-
the Grameen Bank (GB) in Bangladesh. Recent comparative information about them is 
in Table I with emphasis on the two criteria increasingly accepted as the appropriate 
4 
I 
framework for analysis: outreach and self-sustainability (Christen, et al., 1995; Yaron, Benjamin 
and Piprek, 1997). Outreach refers to the degree of market coverage for low-income groups 
previously without access to formal financial services. It includes both the horizontal dimension 
(breadth of outreach or number of clients served) and the vertical dimension (depth or level of 
poverty of clients). In addition, the types and variety of financial services offered are also 
considered. 
Sustainability refers to the ability of a financial institution to supply financial services on 
a continuous cost-covering basis without external subsidies. The Subsidy Dependence Index 
(SDI) has been widely adopted to evaluate subsidization (Yaron, 1992). Sustainability is 
desirable for at least two reasons: first, temporary access to loans produces some benefits, but 
creating a long-term sustainable financial relationship is more valuable because it provides 
opportunities for future benefits. A sustainable institution will benefit more clients than one that 
I 
begins with a flourish but later collapses. Second, a sustainable institution is free from budgetary 
dependency on government and donors so borrowers can expect long-term access to loans if they 
repay promptly. This helps the institutions grow and protects them from political intrusions. 
Some analysts fear a potential trade-off between outreach and sustainability (e.g. Hulme 
i 
and Mosley, 1996). Institutions striving for self-sustainability may opt to reduce costs through 
making larger sized repeat loans to existing clients rather than serving more new poor clients with 
small loans. Realizing economies of scale through wider outreach may contribute to 
sustainability since per unit lending costs decline as loan volume rises, while reaching greater 
I 
depth of outreach may detract from sustainability if the costs and risks of lending are not covered 
by interest income. These three achieve both dimensions of outreach, but sustainability needs to 
I 
be improved in two. 
The three institutions have slightly different objectives. BAAC was created in 1966 
specifica~ly to serve agriculture. BRI-UD was reorganized in 1983/84, following the collapse of 
5 
the subs~dized BIMAS program, to serve rural low- and middle- income households and its 
portfolio has been dominated by loans for trading and other nonfarm activities. GB started as an 
NGO in 1976 to serve the poor and became a specialized bank for the poor in 1983. Almost 90 
percent M its current clients are women, and many borrow for farm-related and nonfarm 
activities. 
All three institutions lend to millions of clients, but BAAC is relatively more successful 
as it readhes over 80 percent of the country's farm families. It has a larger loan portfolio and a 
larger average loan size. BAAC also performs well in reaching the poor as seen by the 
comparison of average loan size with the country's GDP per capita. GB largely makes group 
! 
loans, BRI-UD makes only individual loans, and BAAC uses both types of technology. 
Performance in savings mobilization sharply differentiates the three. The total savings 
for BAA~ and BRI-UD are roughly equal, but the number of savers is much larger in BRI-UD. 
The total savings in BRI-UD far exceed its loan balances, while BAAC and GB rely on other 
sources of funds for a significant share of their total lending. GB does not actively promote 
voluntary savings. Sustainability is the second major difference among the three. BAAC 
employs a low interest rate policy so its interest rate spread is the smallest and, although highly 
efficient (3.5 percent operating costs), its profits and return on assets are low. It has some loan 
arrears, especially for loans made to cooperatives and farmer associations. It would need to raise 
the average yield on loans from 11 to almost 15 percent to become free of subsidies. The GB has 
an even more serious problem because it would have to raise its nominal interest rate on general 
loans from 20 to 33 percent to be subsidy free. BRI-UD charges the highest interest rates and 
earns the highest rate spread so it can easily cover its higher operating costs. It was so profitable 
in 1995 tbat it could have reduced its yield on loan portfolio from 31.6 to 16.3 percent and 
remained free of subsidy. Other things being equal, BAAC would need to charge roughly 15 
6 
I 
percent on loans, BRI-UD almost 16 percent, and GB about 33 percent.2 Considering differences 
in loan s~zes, it should be expected that BAAC would reach self-sufficiency with lower interest 
rates, while the GB would need to charge the highest rates. 
I 
IV. Factors that Contribute to the Success of these Financial Institutions 
Why have these flagship institutions succeeded relatively well when so many Asian 
institutions perform poorly? Each case is unique but several systematic factors contribute to their 
success. I They are summarized here under a three-pronged analytical framework of policy 
environment, financial infrastructure, and institutional development. 
I 
A. Policy Environment 
!lthough the past urban bias of economic policies in some Asian countries has been 
reduced, many policy issues influence the prospects for developing sound rural financial markets. 
I 
1. Interest Rates. The first problem is that interest rates for farm and microenterprise 
loans arj controlled in some countries, and financial institutions resist raising rates in countries 
where they are deregulated. Rates must be high enough so interest spreads cover operating costs 
and lossqs. Savings rates must be positive in real terms to stimulate savers to deposit funds for 
lending, and owners must earn enough profits for a reasonable return on capital, for reserves and 
for reinvbstment for future growth. Therefore, institutions must be free to price their loans and 
other serwices to cover costs and risks. The low interest-rate policies ofBAAC and GB are 
I 
I 
intended to assist borrowers, but they force the institutions to rely on governments and donors for 
continuohs subsidies, which introduce uncertainties and the possibility of political intervention. 
BRI-UD determines its rate structure so it avoids some of these problems. 
' 
2 These values vary from year to year depending on the amount of subsidies received. It would be 
necessary to evaluate carefully loan loss provisions, profits needed for future investment and growth, and 
several oler factors before determining optimum interest rates. 
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the second problem is that unsubsidized institutions must compete with subsidized ones. 
This is al serious problem in Indonesia because the government, the World Bank, and the UNDP 
have pumped subsidized credit into village projects to alleviate the effects of the financial crisis. 
I 
BRI-UD may not be greatly affected but other rural financial institutions are hurt by this 
I 
competiJion. The soft conditions and weak enforcement procedures associated with these special 
projects tnay undermine the repayment culture as loans are treated as grants. Emergency 
assistan9e must be channeled through networks other than financial institutions. 
l Client Selection. Freedom to set interest rates is often linked to freedom to select 
clients. Subsidized credit projects usually carry restrictions about the target group. The more 
I 
narrowly specified the target group (e.g. small rice farmers), the greater the risk that lenders will 
be induc~d into risky, undiversified portfolios. Moreover, large subsidies often encourage greater 
political ~ntrusion in credit allocation. These three institutions generally select their own clients, 
but BAAf C administers some special government projects and has been restricted in serving 
nonfarm ,enterprises. Financial institutions need the flexibility to design and market financial 
I 
' 
services that match the demands of potential clients. They must avoid targeted programs that 
I 
constrairl them to serve only a specific group or type of client because this will limit their ability 
to diverstfy their portfolios as a protection against systemic risks. Clients should self-select 
themselvles to use products offered by specific institutions rather than being targeted by 
program~. Freedom of choice by clients and institutions permits the development of healthy 
banking relationships. Institutions may choose to market specific products to specific clients. 
! 
For example, GB shifted its emphasis towards women who are better suited than men for group 
lending lnd weekly meetings. Some MFOs reduce risks by lending only to those micro clients 
who hav¢ successfully operated their businesses for several months before seeking a loan. 
B. Fina,cial Infrastructure 
8 
~erhaps one of the most overlooked aspects of Asian rural financial market performance 
is the firlancial infrastructure needed for efficient financial intermediation. Infrastructure is 
important because it affects the operational costs of all financial institutions. 
1. Legal and Regulatory Framework. The flagship institutions have advantages 
comparer to nonregulated competitors because they operate under charters that permit them to 
legally qiobilize deposits. The protection of savings mobilized by MFOs is an important 
! 
regulator issue. The regulatory capacity in the three countries has been questioned but 
i 
institutional safety and soundness have thus far been assured. However, the Asian financial crisis 
I 
in 1997/98 revealed the need for stronger regulatory capacities in the region (Kochkar, Loungani, 
and Stone, 1998). 
! 
An important lesson in Bangladesh is that MFOs can temporarily avoid some problems 
affectinJ the commercial banking system, such as expensive legal procedures to collect loans. 
When ctlents are motivated to repay because of peer pressure and their demand for new loans, the 
legal cortditions for contract enforcement may not be so important. However, problems may 
develop ~hen larger loans are made requiring more traditional forms of contract enforcement. 
The mor~ MFOs act like traditional banks, the more they can expect to face banking problems. 
1- Information Systems. No systematic analysis has been made of information systems 
in these ~hree countries. GB has a centralized accounting system that protected it when last 
' 
year's tlQod damaged the records of other MFOs. Land titling projects in Thailand reduce the 
I 
transaction costs for lenders by making it easier and cheaper to access information about the legal 
I 
status of'land offered as collateral. Efficient systems to supply information about borrower 
I 
indebtedness and repayment history are required as financial markets become more sophisticated. 
Lenders heed ready access to accurate information about the debts of loan applicants. Regulated 
institutiobs provide names of delinquent borrowers so one institution knows a borrower's status 
with another institution, but this information is usually not available from nonregulated 
9 
institutiqns. Countries without national identity cards, such as India, have special problems in 
verifying client identity. 
C. Institutional Development 
The three flagship institutions have undergone a long process of institutional 
development involving complex interactions between institutional design, management and 
governance, incentive systems, human capital development, and a variety of other factors 
! (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega,1996; Yaron, et al., 1997). 
1. The Design of Products and Services. Financial institutions must design their 
products and services considering two objectives. The first is expected demand from perspective 
i 
! 
clients and the second is the ability to cover costs and generate profits, either as single 
transactions or over the expected life of a relationship with a client. For example, financial 
institutions may not be able to competitively offer very small, emergency loans supplied by the 
informal sector; however, BAAC and GB have successfully designed products and technologies 
for short-term working capital loans without formal collateral normally required by banks. These 
three institutions use market research, test marketing, and pilot projects to test and adapt their 
products to meet client demands. BRI-UD and BAAC developed attractive savings products that 
contributed to their growth in savings. Moreover, unlike most targeted credit projects, these 
institutions lend for a variety of purposes recognizing that clients are usually the best judges of 
how to use loans. However, they are strict in expecting repayment regardless of how borrowers 
use the l<?an proceeds. 
2. Loan Recovery. The difference between the success and failure of financial 
institutions is often determined by loan recovery. These three institutions report arrears rates of 
less tharnten percent and their actual loss rate is much lower. Repayment rates are determined by 
several factors. First, successful institutions design products that improve the borrowers' ability 
to repay, for example, by making small loans and setting repayment schedules consistent with 
IO 
borrower cash flow. The weekly repayment schedules used by the GB results in small sized 
payments and frequent contact with clients. The loss of customers may be a sign that products 
and techhologies need to be changed. For example, the GB and some MFOs in Bangladesh have 
recently experienced high drop-out rates. This is a sign that loan products, repayment schedules, 
and savings requirements may be excessively rigid (Wright, 1999). 
Second, institutions increase borrower willingness to repay in two ways. Peer pressure 
among group members may encourage repayment for lenders making joint-liability loans. An 
even more important factor is the positive image of institutions seeking long-term relationships 
with cliebts, so the expectation of future loans with superior terms and conditions induces good 
repayment. In addition, BRI-UD uses the positive incentive of interest relates as a stimulus for 
on-time payments, while BAAC imposes late payment penalties. 
' 
I 
Timely information about clients is a third factor affecting repayment. These three 
institutions have good internal information systems so loan officers know immediately when 
loans be<;ome overdue, and can follow up with clients and arrange for repayment. The open 
! 
weekly GB meetings where loan payments and savings deposits are made provide transparency 
so clients immediately know who is not paying and this places social pressure on delinquent 
borrowe~s. 
I 
3. Management and Governance. Managing large institutions with thousands of staff and 
hundreds of outlets is a huge task in countries with poor communication infrastructure. These 
three institutions have the reputation of being professionally managed and have considerable 
autonomy in day-to-day operations. The founders ofBRI-UD and GB are well known for their 
vision and commitment, and they have instilled these traits in their subordinates. The Thai 
governm~nt has consistently chosen high quality managers for BAAC because good management 
i 
and efficiency rather than political expediency were demanded by the governance system. At 
times, foreign advisors may have protected BRI-UD from political pressures and poor decisions. 
I I 
l. Stafflncentive Systems. Employees desire to retain their employment in these 
institut+s because base salaries are higher than some equivalent jobs in the public or private 
sector. the BRI-UD system was designed as profit and loss centers, which provides a framework 
I 
! 
for perftmance-based remuneration. Both BRI-UD and BAAC use bonus payments to stimulate 
staff effibiency. Bonuses are paid either on overall institutional performance or on individual 
employe~ efficiency. Incentives encourage loan officers to manage many clients and a large 
portfoli . GB operates under difficult constraints because of the personnel policies of the 
bureauc atic state-owned banks, so group spirit and social commitment are used to enhance staff 
perform nee. In the recent flood, GB first aided its employees so they could later effectively 
service t eir clients, and special compensation and vacation time were granted to employees 
working under difficult circumstances. 
l. Human Capital Development. The three institutions use recruitment and hiring 
I 
policiesjo obtain high quality employees. BAAC and GB have higher educational requirements 
for pote tial loan officers, while BRI-UD hires staff with lower education levels but who know 
the locall environment in which they are assigned. All three use intensive training programs to 
teach spicific skills and instill the institutional mission. BAAC has an ADB technical assistance 
I 
project tb upgrade its operations and train staff who need more expertise to exploit its recent 
authorizltion to expand lending to nonfarm enterprises and to increase loan sizes for existing 
I 
' 
farm cli4nts. New staff hired by BRI-UD and BAAC are assigned as trainees or apprentices for 
evaluatiJn before being hired as regular staff. Loan officers in BRI-UD earn higher levels of 
loan app~oval authority as they gain experience, and the decentralization of decisionmaking is 
I 
possible lbecause of investments in human capital development. 
I 
VI. coJclusions and Implications 
I 
~ost Asian rural financial markets are poorly prepared for the 21st century. Many 
instituti4ns are weak and survive because of government and donor funding. They lack technical 
I 
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competence to evaluate credit risks, the financial infrastructure is inadequate, and governmental 
I 
policies are often more destructive than supportive. Financial dualism is increasing, first, in the 
gap in access to financial services between rural and urban firms and households. Second, there 
is increased financial dualism in the "digital divide" that separates those using modern computers 
and communication technologies from those that do not. Fortunately, the new financial markets 
paradigm (Adams, 1998) is taking root in Asia and a market-oriented approach is emerging in 
some countries. Where financial markets have been allowed to operate more freely, performance 
has beenl much better. The relative success of many MFOs can be attributed to their adoption of 
elements of the new paradigm. 
The three-pronged analytical framework of policy environment, financial infrastructure, 
and institutional development suggests areas where most Asian countries need to make 
improvements. Fortunately, Asia has three flagship financial institutions that can serve as models 
for other institutions. Experience has shown that the appropriate role of governments is not to 
engage in an aggressive supply-leading approach to financial market development but to 
concentrate their resources in creating a favorable environment, investing in supportive 
infrastructure, and building institutions. 
,+..dmittedly, Asia faces serious challenges in serving rural areas with large numbers of 
poor people, poor resources, and subject to periodic conflicts and natural disasters. Serving 
agriculture involves more risks and costs than serving microentrepreneurs, so expanding the 
formal fiµancial frontier (Von Pischke, 1991) is not simply a matter of mimicking the successes 
of microfinance. Fortunately, the successes of the flagship institutions demonstrate the potential 
for strong outreach and sustainability when appropriate policies, financial infrastructure and 
institutional designs are employed. This lesson should give encouragement to Brazilians working 
I 
! 
to expand sustainable finance to more rural and microfinance clients. 
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Table.~: Selected Characteristics and Performance Measures of BAAC, BRl-UD, and the Grameen 
! Bank 
Item BAAC BRl-UD GB 
Year established/reorganized 1966 1983/84 1983 
Clientelel Farmers, cooperatives, Rural low-and middle- Rural poor 
farmers' associations income households 
Financial services Loans and savings Loans and savings Loans and 
Lending technology 
deposits deposits compulsory savings 
Group and individual Individual Group 
Approxinliate number of loans 
outstanding 3.1 million 2.3 million 2.1 million 
Volume of loans outstanding $3.8 billion (non- $1.2 billion $289 million 
cooperative loans)a 
Average outstanding loan $1,285 $567 $142 
Average outstanding loan as 
percentage of GDP per capita 42b 54 64 
Average annual volume of 
savings $2.8 billion $2.6 billion $133 million 
Average annual savings as a 
percent of average annual 
outstandrg loans 66.5 199.0 45.6 
Number f savers 4.4 millionc 14.5 million 2.1 million 
Approximate nominal effective 
annual in~erest rate 8.3 to 15.5 32.7 20 
Interest r~te spread 1995: 4.1 1994: 21.7 1995: 8.0 
Total operating costs as percent 
of annual average outstanding 
loans 1995: 3.5 1994: 13.5 1995: 10.6 
Return o~ assets 1995: 0.55 1994: 4.8 1995: 0.14 
Percentage of outstanding 
loans in arrears 8.3 6.5 3.6 
Subsidy ¢lependence index 1995: 35.4b 1995: negatived 1996: positive0 
Source: Adapted from Yaron, Benjamin, and Piprek (1997) except where noted. 
a: BAAC reported total loans outstanding in 1996 of B177 billion (about $6.9 billion). 
b: Reported by Muraki, Webster, and Yaron (1998). According to their estimates, in 1995 BAAC would have had 
to increase its average yield on loan portfolio from 11.0 to 14.89 percent (i.e., 35.4 percent) to be free of 
subsidies. 
c: Reported by Fitchett (1997). 
d: Charitoneko, Patten, and Yaron (1998) reported that the BRI unit desas were so profitable in 1996 that they 
could have reduced their yield on loan portfolio from 31.6 to 16.3 percent and still have remained subsidy 
independent. 
e: Reported by Morduch (1999). According to his calculations, the GB would have to increase its nominal interest 
rate on general loans from 20 to 33 percent to become free of subsidies. 
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